From b6b9834e8da7f3fd91b95f750a4ee7a10bf67435 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alejandro Date: Mon, 3 Jul 2023 15:21:21 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] small fixes restoring wycheproof files restoring wycheproof files2 --- examples/examples_util.h | 2 +- include/secp256k1_ellswift.h | 2 +- sage/group_prover.sage | 2 +- src/ecmult.h | 2 +- src/ecmult_const_impl.h | 2 +- src/field.h | 4 ++-- 6 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/examples/examples_util.h b/examples/examples_util.h index 8e3a8f00cf..3293b64032 100644 --- a/examples/examples_util.h +++ b/examples/examples_util.h @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static void secure_erase(void *ptr, size_t len) { * As best as we can tell, this is sufficient to break any optimisations that * might try to eliminate "superfluous" memsets. * This method used in memzero_explicit() the Linux kernel, too. Its advantage is that it is - * pretty efficient, because the compiler can still implement the memset() efficently, + * pretty efficient, because the compiler can still implement the memset() efficiently, * just not remove it entirely. See "Dead Store Elimination (Still) Considered Harmful" by * Yang et al. (USENIX Security 2017) for more background. */ diff --git a/include/secp256k1_ellswift.h b/include/secp256k1_ellswift.h index c0b898713c..fafd01affb 100644 --- a/include/secp256k1_ellswift.h +++ b/include/secp256k1_ellswift.h @@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_ellswift_create( /** Given a private key, and ElligatorSwift public keys sent in both directions, * compute a shared secret using x-only Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH). * - * Returns: 1: shared secret was succesfully computed + * Returns: 1: shared secret was successfully computed * 0: secret was invalid or hashfp returned 0 * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object. * Out: output: pointer to an array to be filled by hashfp. diff --git a/sage/group_prover.sage b/sage/group_prover.sage index 9305c215d5..bb09295369 100644 --- a/sage/group_prover.sage +++ b/sage/group_prover.sage @@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ def normalize_factor(p): (8) * (-bx + ax)^3 ``` """ - # Assert p is not 0 and that its non-zero coeffients are coprime. + # Assert p is not 0 and that its non-zero coefficients are coprime. # (We could just work with the primitive part p/p.content() but we want to be # aware if factor() does not return a primitive part in future sage versions.) assert p.content() == 1 diff --git a/src/ecmult.h b/src/ecmult.h index e28c602506..326a5eeb43 100644 --- a/src/ecmult.h +++ b/src/ecmult.h @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ # pragma message DEBUG_CONFIG_DEF(ECMULT_WINDOW_SIZE) #endif -/* Noone will ever need more than a window size of 24. The code might +/* No one will ever need more than a window size of 24. The code might * be correct for larger values of ECMULT_WINDOW_SIZE but this is not * tested. * diff --git a/src/ecmult_const_impl.h b/src/ecmult_const_impl.h index 26b3e238d8..06f9e53ffd 100644 --- a/src/ecmult_const_impl.h +++ b/src/ecmult_const_impl.h @@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ static int secp256k1_ecmult_const_xonly(secp256k1_fe* r, const secp256k1_fe *n, * * It is easy to verify that both (n*g, g^2, v) and its negation (n*g, -g^2, v) have affine X * coordinate n/d, and this holds even when the square root function doesn't have a - * determinstic sign. We choose the (n*g, g^2, v) version. + * deterministic sign. We choose the (n*g, g^2, v) version. * * Now switch to the effective affine curve using phi_v, where the input point has coordinates * (n*g, g^2). Compute (X, Y, Z) = q * (n*g, g^2) there. diff --git a/src/field.h b/src/field.h index 38e7389aba..bb99f948ef 100644 --- a/src/field.h +++ b/src/field.h @@ -192,14 +192,14 @@ static int secp256k1_fe_cmp_var(const secp256k1_fe *a, const secp256k1_fe *b); /** Set a field element equal to a provided 32-byte big endian value, reducing it. * - * On input, r does not need to be initalized. a must be a pointer to an initialized 32-byte array. + * On input, r does not need to be initialized. a must be a pointer to an initialized 32-byte array. * On output, r = a (mod p). It will have magnitude 1, and not be normalized. */ static void secp256k1_fe_set_b32_mod(secp256k1_fe *r, const unsigned char *a); /** Set a field element equal to a provided 32-byte big endian value, checking for overflow. * - * On input, r does not need to be initalized. a must be a pointer to an initialized 32-byte array. + * On input, r does not need to be initialized. a must be a pointer to an initialized 32-byte array. * On output, r = a if (a < p), it will be normalized with magnitude 1, and 1 is returned. * If a >= p, 0 is returned, and r will be made invalid (and must not be used without overwriting). */