-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 1
New issue
Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.
By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.
Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account
Bump urllib3 from 2.0.7 to 2.2.2 in /drivers/gpu/drm/ci/xfails #2
Open
dependabot
wants to merge
55
commits into
google_tools_master
Choose a base branch
from
dependabot/pip/drivers/gpu/drm/ci/xfails/urllib3-2.2.2
base: google_tools_master
Could not load branches
Branch not found: {{ refName }}
Loading
Could not load tags
Nothing to show
Loading
Are you sure you want to change the base?
Some commits from the old base branch may be removed from the timeline,
and old review comments may become outdated.
Open
Bump urllib3 from 2.0.7 to 2.2.2 in /drivers/gpu/drm/ci/xfails #2
dependabot
wants to merge
55
commits into
google_tools_master
from
dependabot/pip/drivers/gpu/drm/ci/xfails/urllib3-2.2.2
Conversation
This file contains bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Refactor code to have some more error diagnosis on traps, etc. and to do less work on each line. Add an ignore situation for security failures. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Colin Ian King <[email protected]> Cc: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]> Cc: Kan Liang <[email protected]> Cc: Athira Jajeev <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Compiling C++ BPF programs with existing bpf_helper_defs.h is not possible due to stricter C++ type conversions. C++ complains about (void *) type conversions: $ clang++ --include linux/types.h ./tools/lib/bpf/bpf_helper_defs.h bpf_helper_defs.h:57:67: error: invalid conversion from ‘void*’ to ‘void* (*)(void*, const void*)’ [-fpermissive] 57 | static void *(*bpf_map_lookup_elem)(void *map, const void *key) = (void *) 1; | ^~~~~~~~~~ | | | void* Extend bpf_doc.py to use proper function type instead of void. Before: static void *(*bpf_map_lookup_elem)(void *map, const void *key) = (void *) 1; After: static void *(*bpf_map_lookup_elem)(void *map, const void *key) = (void *(*)(void *map, const void *key)) 1; v2: - add clang++ invocation example (Yonghong) Cc: Yonghong Song <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Peng Wei <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <[email protected]> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected]
Allow multiple metricgroups.json files by handling any file ending with metricgroups.json as a metricgroups file. Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Previous metric constraints were binary, either none or don't group when the NMI watchdog is present. Update to match the definitions in 'enum metric_event_groups' in pmu-events.h. Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Add a function to recursively generate metric group descriptions. Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
It can be convenient to have unnamed metric groups for the sake of organizing other metrics and metric groups. An unspecified name shouldn't contribute to the MetricGroup json value, so don't record it. Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Support negative exponents when parsing from a json metric string by making the numbers after the 'e' optional in the 'Event' insertion fix up. Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Fix events seemingly broken apart at a comma. Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Allow threshold expressions for metrics to be generated. Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Have dedicate encode functions rather than having them embedded in MetricGroup. This is to provide some uniformity in the Metric ToXXX routines. Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Drop adding a pending metric if there is an existing one. Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
For metric groups, skip metrics in the list that are None. This allows functions to better optionally return metrics. Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Generate extra-metrics.json and extra-metricgroups.json from python architecture specific scripts. The metrics themselves will be added in later patches. If a build takes place in tools/perf/ then extra-metrics.json and extra-metricgroups.json are generated in that directory and so added to .gitignore. If there is an OUTPUT directory then the tools/perf/pmu-events/arch files are copied to it so the generated extra-metrics.json and extra-metricgroups.json can be added/generated there. Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Add a LoadEvents function that loads all event json files in a directory. In the Event constructor ensure all events are defined in the event json except for legacy events like "cycles". If the initial event isn't found then legacy_event1 is used, and if that isn't found legacy_event2 is used. This allows a single Event to have multiple event names as models will often rename the same event over time. If the event doesn't exist an exception is raised. So that references to metrics can be added, add the MetricRef class. This doesn't validate as an event name and so provides an escape hatch for metrics to refer to each other. Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Add power per second metrics based on RAPL. Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Compute using the msr PMU the percentage of wallclock cycles where the CPUs are in a low power state. Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
The metric adjusts for whether or not SMT is on. Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
The br metric group for branches itself comprises metric groups for total, taken, conditional, fused and far metric groups using json events. The lack of conditional events on anything but zen2 means this category is lacking on zen1, zen3 and zen4. Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Add metrics that give the utility of software prefetches on zen2, zen3 and zen4. Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Add metrics that give the utility of hardware prefetches on zen2, zen3 and zen4. Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Add metrics that give an overview and details of the l1 itlb (zen1, zen2, zen3) and l2 itlb (all zens). Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Add metrics that give an overview and details of the dtlb (zen1, zen2, zen3). Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Metrics use the amd_l3 PMU for access/miss/hit information. Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Give breakdown of number of instructions. Use the counter mask (cmask) to show the number of cycles taken to retire the instructions. Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Use the counter mask (cmask) to see how many cycles an instruction takes to retire. Present as a set of ILP metrics. Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Metrics break down context switches for different kinds of instruction. Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Add metrics giving ratio of uop cache hits to misses. Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Add a 'cpu_power' metric group that computes the power consumption from RAPL events if they are present. Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Compute using the msr PMU the percentage of wallclock cycles where the CPUs are in a low power state. Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Allow duplicated metric to be dropped from json files. Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
captain5050
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Dec 16, 2024
The current implementation removes cache tags after disabling ATS, leading to potential memory leaks and kernel crashes. Specifically, CACHE_TAG_DEVTLB type cache tags may still remain in the list even after the domain is freed, causing a use-after-free condition. This issue really shows up when multiple VFs from different PFs passed through to a single user-space process via vfio-pci. In such cases, the kernel may crash with kernel messages like: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000014 PGD 19036a067 P4D 1940a3067 PUD 136c9b067 PMD 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 74 UID: 0 PID: 3183 Comm: testCli Not tainted 6.11.9 #2 RIP: 0010:cache_tag_flush_range+0x9b/0x250 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x1f/0x60 ? page_fault_oops+0x163/0x590 ? exc_page_fault+0x72/0x190 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? cache_tag_flush_range+0x9b/0x250 ? cache_tag_flush_range+0x5d/0x250 intel_iommu_tlb_sync+0x29/0x40 intel_iommu_unmap_pages+0xfe/0x160 __iommu_unmap+0xd8/0x1a0 vfio_unmap_unpin+0x182/0x340 [vfio_iommu_type1] vfio_remove_dma+0x2a/0xb0 [vfio_iommu_type1] vfio_iommu_type1_ioctl+0xafa/0x18e0 [vfio_iommu_type1] Move cache_tag_unassign_domain() before iommu_disable_pci_caps() to fix it. Fixes: 3b1d9e2 ("iommu/vt-d: Add cache tag assignment interface") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
captain5050
force-pushed
the
google_tools_master
branch
3 times, most recently
from
December 16, 2024 21:37
db426aa
to
63ccee6
Compare
captain5050
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Dec 19, 2024
Guangguan Wang says: ==================== net: several fixes for smc v1 -> v2: rewrite patch #2 suggested by Paolo. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
captain5050
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 15, 2025
The mapping VMA address is saved in VAS window struct when the paste address is mapped. This VMA address is used during migration to unmap the paste address if the window is active. The paste address mapping will be removed when the window is closed or with the munmap(). But the VMA address in the VAS window is not updated with munmap() which is causing invalid access during migration. The KASAN report shows: [16386.254991] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in reconfig_close_windows+0x1a0/0x4e8 [16386.255043] Read of size 8 at addr c00000014a819670 by task drmgr/696928 [16386.255096] CPU: 29 UID: 0 PID: 696928 Comm: drmgr Kdump: loaded Tainted: G B 6.11.0-rc5-nxgzip #2 [16386.255128] Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE [16386.255148] Hardware name: IBM,9080-HEX Power11 (architected) 0x820200 0xf000007 of:IBM,FW1110.00 (NH1110_016) hv:phyp pSeries [16386.255181] Call Trace: [16386.255202] [c00000016b297660] [c0000000018ad0ac] dump_stack_lvl+0x84/0xe8 (unreliable) [16386.255246] [c00000016b297690] [c0000000006e8a90] print_report+0x19c/0x764 [16386.255285] [c00000016b297760] [c0000000006e9490] kasan_report+0x128/0x1f8 [16386.255309] [c00000016b297880] [c0000000006eb5c8] __asan_load8+0xac/0xe0 [16386.255326] [c00000016b2978a0] [c00000000013f898] reconfig_close_windows+0x1a0/0x4e8 [16386.255343] [c00000016b297990] [c000000000140e58] vas_migration_handler+0x3a4/0x3fc [16386.255368] [c00000016b297a90] [c000000000128848] pseries_migrate_partition+0x4c/0x4c4 ... [16386.256136] Allocated by task 696554 on cpu 31 at 16377.277618s: [16386.256149] kasan_save_stack+0x34/0x68 [16386.256163] kasan_save_track+0x34/0x80 [16386.256175] kasan_save_alloc_info+0x58/0x74 [16386.256196] __kasan_slab_alloc+0xb8/0xdc [16386.256209] kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x200/0x3d0 [16386.256225] vm_area_alloc+0x44/0x150 [16386.256245] mmap_region+0x214/0x10c4 [16386.256265] do_mmap+0x5fc/0x750 [16386.256277] vm_mmap_pgoff+0x14c/0x24c [16386.256292] ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x20c/0x348 [16386.256303] sys_mmap+0xd0/0x160 ... [16386.256350] Freed by task 0 on cpu 31 at 16386.204848s: [16386.256363] kasan_save_stack+0x34/0x68 [16386.256374] kasan_save_track+0x34/0x80 [16386.256384] kasan_save_free_info+0x64/0x10c [16386.256396] __kasan_slab_free+0x120/0x204 [16386.256415] kmem_cache_free+0x128/0x450 [16386.256428] vm_area_free_rcu_cb+0xa8/0xd8 [16386.256441] rcu_do_batch+0x2c8/0xcf0 [16386.256458] rcu_core+0x378/0x3c4 [16386.256473] handle_softirqs+0x20c/0x60c [16386.256495] do_softirq_own_stack+0x6c/0x88 [16386.256509] do_softirq_own_stack+0x58/0x88 [16386.256521] __irq_exit_rcu+0x1a4/0x20c [16386.256533] irq_exit+0x20/0x38 [16386.256544] interrupt_async_exit_prepare.constprop.0+0x18/0x2c ... [16386.256717] Last potentially related work creation: [16386.256729] kasan_save_stack+0x34/0x68 [16386.256741] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xcc/0x12c [16386.256753] __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x94/0xd04 [16386.256766] vm_area_free+0x28/0x3c [16386.256778] remove_vma+0xf4/0x114 [16386.256797] do_vmi_align_munmap.constprop.0+0x684/0x870 [16386.256811] __vm_munmap+0xe0/0x1f8 [16386.256821] sys_munmap+0x54/0x6c [16386.256830] system_call_exception+0x1a0/0x4a0 [16386.256841] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec [16386.256868] The buggy address belongs to the object at c00000014a819670 which belongs to the cache vm_area_struct of size 168 [16386.256887] The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of freed 168-byte region [c00000014a819670, c00000014a819718) [16386.256915] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [16386.256928] page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x14a81 [16386.256950] memcg:c0000000ba430001 [16386.256961] anon flags: 0x43ffff800000000(node=4|zone=0|lastcpupid=0x7ffff) [16386.256975] page_type: 0xfdffffff(slab) [16386.256990] raw: 043ffff800000000 c00000000501c080 0000000000000000 5deadbee00000001 [16386.257003] raw: 0000000000000000 00000000011a011a 00000001fdffffff c0000000ba430001 [16386.257018] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected This patch adds close() callback in vas_vm_ops vm_operations_struct which will be executed during munmap() before freeing VMA. The VMA address in the VAS window is set to NULL after holding the window mmap_mutex. Fixes: 37e6764 ("powerpc/pseries/vas: Add VAS migration handler") Signed-off-by: Haren Myneni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
captain5050
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 15, 2025
Access to genmask field in struct nft_set_ext results in unaligned atomic read: [ 72.130109] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff0000c2bb708c [ 72.131036] Mem abort info: [ 72.131213] ESR = 0x0000000096000021 [ 72.131446] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 72.132209] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 72.133216] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 72.134080] FSC = 0x21: alignment fault [ 72.135593] Data abort info: [ 72.137194] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000021, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 72.142351] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 72.145989] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [ 72.150115] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000237d27000 [ 72.154893] [ffff0000c2bb708c] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=180000023ffff403, pud=180000023f84b403, pmd=180000023f835403, +pte=0068000102bb7707 [ 72.163021] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000021 [#1] SMP [...] [ 72.170041] CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 54 Comm: kworker/7:0 Tainted: G E 6.13.0-rc3+ #2 [ 72.170509] Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [ 72.170720] Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS edk2-stable202302-for-qemu 03/01/2023 [ 72.171192] Workqueue: events_power_efficient nft_rhash_gc [nf_tables] [ 72.171552] pstate: 21400005 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 72.171915] pc : nft_rhash_gc+0x200/0x2d8 [nf_tables] [ 72.172166] lr : nft_rhash_gc+0x128/0x2d8 [nf_tables] [ 72.172546] sp : ffff800081f2bce0 [ 72.172724] x29: ffff800081f2bd40 x28: ffff0000c2bb708c x27: 0000000000000038 [ 72.173078] x26: ffff0000c6780ef0 x25: ffff0000c643df00 x24: ffff0000c6778f78 [ 72.173431] x23: 000000000000001a x22: ffff0000c4b1f000 x21: ffff0000c6780f78 [ 72.173782] x20: ffff0000c2bb70dc x19: ffff0000c2bb7080 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 72.174135] x17: ffff0000c0a4e1c0 x16: 0000000000003000 x15: 0000ac26d173b978 [ 72.174485] x14: ffffffffffffffff x13: 0000000000000030 x12: ffff0000c6780ef0 [ 72.174841] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffff800081f2bcf8 x9 : ffff0000c3000000 [ 72.175193] x8 : 00000000000004be x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000 [ 72.175544] x5 : 0000000000000040 x4 : ffff0000c3000010 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 72.175871] x2 : 0000000000003a98 x1 : ffff0000c2bb708c x0 : 0000000000000004 [ 72.176207] Call trace: [ 72.176316] nft_rhash_gc+0x200/0x2d8 [nf_tables] (P) [ 72.176653] process_one_work+0x178/0x3d0 [ 72.176831] worker_thread+0x200/0x3f0 [ 72.176995] kthread+0xe8/0xf8 [ 72.177130] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 72.177289] Code: 54fff984 d503201f d2800080 91003261 (f820303f) [ 72.177557] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Align struct nft_set_ext to word size to address this and documentation it. pahole reports that this increases the size of elements for rhash and pipapo in 8 bytes on x86_64. Fixes: 7ffc748 ("netfilter: nft_set_hash: skip duplicated elements pending gc run") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
captain5050
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 15, 2025
syzbot reports that a recent fix causes nesting issues between the (now) raw timeoutlock and the eventfd locking: ============================= [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] 6.13.0-rc4-00080-g9828a4c0901f #29 Not tainted ----------------------------- kworker/u32:0/68094 is trying to lock: ffff000014d7a520 (&ctx->wqh#2){..-.}-{3:3}, at: eventfd_signal_mask+0x64/0x180 other info that might help us debug this: context-{5:5} 6 locks held by kworker/u32:0/68094: #0: ffff0000c1d98148 ((wq_completion)iou_exit){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x4e8/0xfc0 #1: ffff80008d927c78 ((work_completion)(&ctx->exit_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x53c/0xfc0 #2: ffff0000c59bc3d8 (&ctx->completion_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: io_kill_timeouts+0x40/0x180 #3: ffff0000c59bc358 (&ctx->timeout_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: io_kill_timeouts+0x48/0x180 #4: ffff800085127aa0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_lock_acquire+0x8/0x38 #5: ffff800085127aa0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_lock_acquire+0x8/0x38 stack backtrace: CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 68094 Comm: kworker/u32:0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4-00080-g9828a4c0901f #29 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Workqueue: iou_exit io_ring_exit_work Call trace: show_stack+0x1c/0x30 (C) __dump_stack+0x24/0x30 dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x80 dump_stack+0x14/0x20 __lock_acquire+0x19f8/0x60c8 lock_acquire+0x1a4/0x540 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x90/0xd0 eventfd_signal_mask+0x64/0x180 io_eventfd_signal+0x64/0x108 io_req_local_work_add+0x294/0x430 __io_req_task_work_add+0x1c0/0x270 io_kill_timeout+0x1f0/0x288 io_kill_timeouts+0xd4/0x180 io_uring_try_cancel_requests+0x2e8/0x388 io_ring_exit_work+0x150/0x550 process_one_work+0x5e8/0xfc0 worker_thread+0x7ec/0xc80 kthread+0x24c/0x300 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 because after the preempt-rt fix for the timeout lock nesting inside the io-wq lock, we now have the eventfd spinlock nesting inside the raw timeout spinlock. Rather than play whack-a-mole with other nesting on the timeout lock, split the deletion and killing of timeouts so queueing the task_work for the timeout cancelations can get done outside of the timeout lock. Reported-by: [email protected] Fixes: 020b40f ("io_uring: make ctx->timeout_lock a raw spinlock") Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
captain5050
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 15, 2025
…le_direct_reclaim() The task sometimes continues looping in throttle_direct_reclaim() because allow_direct_reclaim(pgdat) keeps returning false. #0 [ffff80002cb6f8d0] __switch_to at ffff8000080095ac #1 [ffff80002cb6f900] __schedule at ffff800008abbd1c #2 [ffff80002cb6f990] schedule at ffff800008abc50c #3 [ffff80002cb6f9b0] throttle_direct_reclaim at ffff800008273550 #4 [ffff80002cb6fa20] try_to_free_pages at ffff800008277b68 #5 [ffff80002cb6fae0] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffff8000082c4660 #6 [ffff80002cb6fc50] alloc_pages_vma at ffff8000082e4a98 #7 [ffff80002cb6fca0] do_anonymous_page at ffff80000829f5a8 #8 [ffff80002cb6fce0] __handle_mm_fault at ffff8000082a5974 #9 [ffff80002cb6fd90] handle_mm_fault at ffff8000082a5bd4 At this point, the pgdat contains the following two zones: NODE: 4 ZONE: 0 ADDR: ffff00817fffe540 NAME: "DMA32" SIZE: 20480 MIN/LOW/HIGH: 11/28/45 VM_STAT: NR_FREE_PAGES: 359 NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_ANON: 18813 NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_ANON: 0 NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_FILE: 50 NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_FILE: 0 NR_ZONE_UNEVICTABLE: 0 NR_ZONE_WRITE_PENDING: 0 NR_MLOCK: 0 NR_BOUNCE: 0 NR_ZSPAGES: 0 NR_FREE_CMA_PAGES: 0 NODE: 4 ZONE: 1 ADDR: ffff00817fffec00 NAME: "Normal" SIZE: 8454144 PRESENT: 98304 MIN/LOW/HIGH: 68/166/264 VM_STAT: NR_FREE_PAGES: 146 NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_ANON: 94668 NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_ANON: 3 NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_FILE: 735 NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_FILE: 78 NR_ZONE_UNEVICTABLE: 0 NR_ZONE_WRITE_PENDING: 0 NR_MLOCK: 0 NR_BOUNCE: 0 NR_ZSPAGES: 0 NR_FREE_CMA_PAGES: 0 In allow_direct_reclaim(), while processing ZONE_DMA32, the sum of inactive/active file-backed pages calculated in zone_reclaimable_pages() based on the result of zone_page_state_snapshot() is zero. Additionally, since this system lacks swap, the calculation of inactive/ active anonymous pages is skipped. crash> p nr_swap_pages nr_swap_pages = $1937 = { counter = 0 } As a result, ZONE_DMA32 is deemed unreclaimable and skipped, moving on to the processing of the next zone, ZONE_NORMAL, despite ZONE_DMA32 having free pages significantly exceeding the high watermark. The problem is that the pgdat->kswapd_failures hasn't been incremented. crash> px ((struct pglist_data *) 0xffff00817fffe540)->kswapd_failures $1935 = 0x0 This is because the node deemed balanced. The node balancing logic in balance_pgdat() evaluates all zones collectively. If one or more zones (e.g., ZONE_DMA32) have enough free pages to meet their watermarks, the entire node is deemed balanced. This causes balance_pgdat() to exit early before incrementing the kswapd_failures, as it considers the overall memory state acceptable, even though some zones (like ZONE_NORMAL) remain under significant pressure. The patch ensures that zone_reclaimable_pages() includes free pages (NR_FREE_PAGES) in its calculation when no other reclaimable pages are available (e.g., file-backed or anonymous pages). This change prevents zones like ZONE_DMA32, which have sufficient free pages, from being mistakenly deemed unreclaimable. By doing so, the patch ensures proper node balancing, avoids masking pressure on other zones like ZONE_NORMAL, and prevents infinite loops in throttle_direct_reclaim() caused by allow_direct_reclaim(pgdat) repeatedly returning false. The kernel hangs due to a task stuck in throttle_direct_reclaim(), caused by a node being incorrectly deemed balanced despite pressure in certain zones, such as ZONE_NORMAL. This issue arises from zone_reclaimable_pages() returning 0 for zones without reclaimable file- backed or anonymous pages, causing zones like ZONE_DMA32 with sufficient free pages to be skipped. The lack of swap or reclaimable pages results in ZONE_DMA32 being ignored during reclaim, masking pressure in other zones. Consequently, pgdat->kswapd_failures remains 0 in balance_pgdat(), preventing fallback mechanisms in allow_direct_reclaim() from being triggered, leading to an infinite loop in throttle_direct_reclaim(). This patch modifies zone_reclaimable_pages() to account for free pages (NR_FREE_PAGES) when no other reclaimable pages exist. This ensures zones with sufficient free pages are not skipped, enabling proper balancing and reclaim behavior. [[email protected]: coding-style cleanups] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 5a1c84b ("mm: remove reclaim and compaction retry approximations") Signed-off-by: Seiji Nishikawa <[email protected]> Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
captain5050
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 15, 2025
We found a timeout problem with the pldm command on our system. The reason is that the MCTP-I3C driver has a race condition when receiving multiple-packet messages in multi-thread, resulting in a wrong packet order problem. We identified this problem by adding a debug message to the mctp_i3c_read function. According to the MCTP spec, a multiple-packet message must be composed in sequence, and if there is a wrong sequence, the whole message will be discarded and wait for the next SOM. For example, SOM → Pkt Seq #2 → Pkt Seq #1 → Pkt Seq #3 → EOM. Therefore, we try to solve this problem by adding a mutex to the mctp_i3c_read function. Before the modification, when a command requesting a multiple-packet message response is sent consecutively, an error usually occurs within 100 loops. After the mutex, it can go through 40000 loops without any error, and it seems to run well. Fixes: c8755b2 ("mctp i3c: MCTP I3C driver") Signed-off-by: Leo Yang <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] [[email protected]: dropped already answered question from changelog] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
captain5050
force-pushed
the
google_tools_master
branch
from
January 15, 2025 03:52
4013941
to
2907988
Compare
captain5050
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 16, 2025
Fix a lockdep warning [1] observed during the write combining test. The warning indicates a potential nested lock scenario that could lead to a deadlock. However, this is a false positive alarm because the SF lock and its parent lock are distinct ones. The lockdep confusion arises because the locks belong to the same object class (i.e., struct mlx5_core_dev). To resolve this, the code has been refactored to avoid taking both locks. Instead, only the parent lock is acquired. [1] raw_ethernet_bw/2118 is trying to acquire lock: [ 213.619032] ffff88811dd75e08 (&dev->wc_state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core] [ 213.620270] [ 213.620270] but task is already holding lock: [ 213.620943] ffff88810b585e08 (&dev->wc_state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_wc_support_get+0x10c/0x210 [mlx5_core] [ 213.622045] [ 213.622045] other info that might help us debug this: [ 213.622778] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 213.622778] [ 213.623465] CPU0 [ 213.623815] ---- [ 213.624148] lock(&dev->wc_state_lock); [ 213.624615] lock(&dev->wc_state_lock); [ 213.625071] [ 213.625071] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 213.625071] [ 213.625805] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [ 213.625805] [ 213.626522] 4 locks held by raw_ethernet_bw/2118: [ 213.627019] #0: ffff88813f80d578 (&uverbs_dev->disassociate_srcu){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xc4/0x170 [ib_uverbs] [ 213.628088] #1: ffff88810fb23930 (&file->hw_destroy_rwsem){.+.+}-{3:3}, at: ib_init_ucontext+0x2d/0xf0 [ib_uverbs] [ 213.629094] #2: ffff88810fb23878 (&file->ucontext_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ib_init_ucontext+0x49/0xf0 [ib_uverbs] [ 213.630106] #3: ffff88810b585e08 (&dev->wc_state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_wc_support_get+0x10c/0x210 [mlx5_core] [ 213.631185] [ 213.631185] stack backtrace: [ 213.631718] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2118 Comm: raw_ethernet_bw Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7_internal_net_next_mlx5_89a0ad0 #1 [ 213.632722] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 213.633785] Call Trace: [ 213.634099] [ 213.634393] dump_stack_lvl+0x7e/0xc0 [ 213.634806] print_deadlock_bug+0x278/0x3c0 [ 213.635265] __lock_acquire+0x15f4/0x2c40 [ 213.635712] lock_acquire+0xcd/0x2d0 [ 213.636120] ? mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core] [ 213.636722] ? mlx5_ib_enable_lb+0x24/0xa0 [mlx5_ib] [ 213.637277] __mutex_lock+0x81/0xda0 [ 213.637697] ? mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core] [ 213.638305] ? mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core] [ 213.638902] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70 [ 213.639400] ? mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core] [ 213.640016] mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core] [ 213.640615] set_ucontext_resp+0x68/0x2b0 [mlx5_ib] [ 213.641144] ? debug_mutex_init+0x33/0x40 [ 213.641586] mlx5_ib_alloc_ucontext+0x18e/0x7b0 [mlx5_ib] [ 213.642145] ib_init_ucontext+0xa0/0xf0 [ib_uverbs] [ 213.642679] ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_GET_CONTEXT+0x95/0xc0 [ib_uverbs] [ 213.643426] ? _copy_from_user+0x46/0x80 [ 213.643878] ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0xa6b/0xc80 [ib_uverbs] [ 213.644426] ? ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_INVOKE_WRITE+0x130/0x130 [ib_uverbs] [ 213.645213] ? __lock_acquire+0xa99/0x2c40 [ 213.645675] ? lock_acquire+0xcd/0x2d0 [ 213.646101] ? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xc4/0x170 [ib_uverbs] [ 213.646625] ? reacquire_held_locks+0xcf/0x1f0 [ 213.647102] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x45d/0x770 [ 213.647586] ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xe0/0x170 [ib_uverbs] [ 213.648102] ? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xc4/0x170 [ib_uverbs] [ 213.648632] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x4d3/0xaa0 [ 213.649060] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x4a8/0x770 [ 213.649528] do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 [ 213.649947] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 [ 213.650478] RIP: 0033:0x7fa179b0737b [ 213.650893] Code: ff ff ff 85 c0 79 9b 49 c7 c4 ff ff ff ff 5b 5d 4c 89 e0 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 7d 2a 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 213.652619] RSP: 002b:00007ffd2e6d46e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [ 213.653390] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffd2e6d47f8 RCX: 00007fa179b0737b [ 213.654084] RDX: 00007ffd2e6d47e0 RSI: 00000000c0181b01 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 213.654767] RBP: 00007ffd2e6d47c0 R08: 00007fa1799be010 R09: 0000000000000002 [ 213.655453] R10: 00007ffd2e6d4960 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffd2e6d487c [ 213.656170] R13: 0000000000000027 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 00007ffd2e6d4f70 Fixes: d98995b ("net/mlx5: Reimplement write combining test") Signed-off-by: Yishai Hadas <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Michael Guralnik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Larysa Zaremba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
captain5050
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 16, 2025
Clear the port select structure on error so no stale values left after definers are destroyed. That's because the mlx5_lag_destroy_definers() always try to destroy all lag definers in the tt_map, so in the flow below lag definers get double-destroyed and cause kernel crash: mlx5_lag_port_sel_create() mlx5_lag_create_definers() mlx5_lag_create_definer() <- Failed on tt 1 mlx5_lag_destroy_definers() <- definers[tt=0] gets destroyed mlx5_lag_port_sel_create() mlx5_lag_create_definers() mlx5_lag_create_definer() <- Failed on tt 0 mlx5_lag_destroy_definers() <- definers[tt=0] gets double-destroyed Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000008 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000096000005 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005, ISS2 = 0x00000000 CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 user pgtable: 64k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000112ce2e00 [0000000000000008] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000, pud=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: iptable_raw bonding ip_gre ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 geneve ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel ipip tunnel4 ip_tunnel rdma_ucm(OE) rdma_cm(OE) iw_cm(OE) ib_ipoib(OE) ib_cm(OE) ib_umad(OE) mlx5_ib(OE) ib_uverbs(OE) mlx5_fwctl(OE) fwctl(OE) mlx5_core(OE) mlxdevm(OE) ib_core(OE) mlxfw(OE) memtrack(OE) mlx_compat(OE) openvswitch nsh nf_conncount psample xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xfrm_user xfrm_algo xt_addrtype iptable_filter iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 br_netfilter bridge stp llc netconsole overlay efi_pstore sch_fq_codel zram ip_tables crct10dif_ce qemu_fw_cfg fuse ipv6 crc_ccitt [last unloaded: mlx_compat(OE)] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 217 Comm: kworker/u53:2 Tainted: G OE 6.11.0+ #2 Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 Workqueue: mlx5_lag mlx5_do_bond_work [mlx5_core] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : mlx5_del_flow_rules+0x24/0x2c0 [mlx5_core] lr : mlx5_lag_destroy_definer+0x54/0x100 [mlx5_core] sp : ffff800085fafb00 x29: ffff800085fafb00 x28: ffff0000da0c8000 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: ffff0000da0c8000 x25: ffff0000da0c8000 x24: ffff0000da0c8000 x23: ffff0000c31f81a0 x22: 0400000000000000 x21: ffff0000da0c8000 x20: 0000000000000000 x19: 0000000000000001 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000ffff8b0c9350 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffff800081390d18 x12: ffff800081dc3cc0 x11: 0000000000000001 x10: 0000000000000b10 x9 : ffff80007ab7304c x8 : ffff0000d00711f0 x7 : 0000000000000004 x6 : 0000000000000190 x5 : ffff00027edb3010 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffff0000d39b8000 x1 : ffff0000d39b8000 x0 : 0400000000000000 Call trace: mlx5_del_flow_rules+0x24/0x2c0 [mlx5_core] mlx5_lag_destroy_definer+0x54/0x100 [mlx5_core] mlx5_lag_destroy_definers+0xa0/0x108 [mlx5_core] mlx5_lag_port_sel_create+0x2d4/0x6f8 [mlx5_core] mlx5_activate_lag+0x60c/0x6f8 [mlx5_core] mlx5_do_bond_work+0x284/0x5c8 [mlx5_core] process_one_work+0x170/0x3e0 worker_thread+0x2d8/0x3e0 kthread+0x11c/0x128 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Code: a9025bf5 aa0003f6 a90363f7 f90023f9 (f9400400) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fixes: dc48516 ("net/mlx5: Lag, add support to create definers for LAG") Signed-off-by: Mark Zhang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Mark Bloch <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
captain5050
force-pushed
the
google_tools_master
branch
from
January 16, 2025 18:22
2907988
to
deb2630
Compare
captain5050
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 17, 2025
This commit addresses a circular locking dependency issue within the GFX isolation mechanism. The problem was identified by a warning indicating a potential deadlock due to inconsistent lock acquisition order. - The `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use` and `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_end_use` functions previously acquired `enforce_isolation_mutex` and called `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl`, leading to potential deadlocks. ie., If `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` is called while `enforce_isolation_mutex` is held, and `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler` is called while `kfd_sch_mutex` is held, it can create a circular dependency. By ensuring consistent lock usage, this fix resolves the issue: [ 606.297333] ====================================================== [ 606.297343] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 606.297353] 6.10.0-amd-mlkd-610-311224-lof #19 Tainted: G OE [ 606.297365] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 606.297375] kworker/u96:3/3825 is trying to acquire lock: [ 606.297385] ffff9aa64e431cb8 ((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x232/0x610 [ 606.297413] but task is already holding lock: [ 606.297423] ffff9aa64e432338 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.297725] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 606.297738] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 606.297749] -> #2 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 606.297765] __mutex_lock+0x85/0x930 [ 606.297776] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 606.297786] amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.298007] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.298225] amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu] [ 606.298412] amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu] [ 606.298603] amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu] [ 606.298866] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched] [ 606.298880] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680 [ 606.298890] worker_thread+0x190/0x350 [ 606.298899] kthread+0xe7/0x120 [ 606.298908] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [ 606.298919] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 606.298929] -> #1 (&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 606.298947] __mutex_lock+0x85/0x930 [ 606.298956] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 606.298966] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler+0x87/0x370 [amdgpu] [ 606.299190] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680 [ 606.299199] worker_thread+0x190/0x350 [ 606.299208] kthread+0xe7/0x120 [ 606.299217] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [ 606.299227] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 606.299236] -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 606.299257] __lock_acquire+0x16f9/0x2810 [ 606.299267] lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300 [ 606.299276] __flush_work+0x250/0x610 [ 606.299286] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x71/0x80 [ 606.299296] amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x287/0x4d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.299509] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.299723] amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu] [ 606.299909] amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu] [ 606.300101] amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu] [ 606.300355] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched] [ 606.300369] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680 [ 606.300378] worker_thread+0x190/0x350 [ 606.300387] kthread+0xe7/0x120 [ 606.300396] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [ 606.300406] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 606.300416] other info that might help us debug this: [ 606.300428] Chain exists of: (work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work) --> &adev->enforce_isolation_mutex --> &adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex [ 606.300458] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 606.300468] CPU0 CPU1 [ 606.300476] ---- ---- [ 606.300484] lock(&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex); [ 606.300494] lock(&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex); [ 606.300508] lock(&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex); [ 606.300521] lock((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)); [ 606.300536] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 606.300546] 5 locks held by kworker/u96:3/3825: [ 606.300555] #0: ffff9aa5aa1f5d58 ((wq_completion)comp_1.1.0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x3f5/0x680 [ 606.300577] #1: ffffaa53c3c97e40 ((work_completion)(&sched->work_run_job)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1d6/0x680 [ 606.300600] #2: ffff9aa64e463c98 (&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x1c3/0x5d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.300837] #3: ffff9aa64e432338 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.301062] #4: ffffffff8c1a5660 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __flush_work+0x70/0x610 [ 606.301083] stack backtrace: [ 606.301092] CPU: 14 PID: 3825 Comm: kworker/u96:3 Tainted: G OE 6.10.0-amd-mlkd-610-311224-lof #19 [ 606.301109] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. X570S GAMING X/X570S GAMING X, BIOS F7 03/22/2024 [ 606.301124] Workqueue: comp_1.1.0 drm_sched_run_job_work [gpu_sched] [ 606.301140] Call Trace: [ 606.301146] <TASK> [ 606.301154] dump_stack_lvl+0x9b/0xf0 [ 606.301166] dump_stack+0x10/0x20 [ 606.301175] print_circular_bug+0x26c/0x340 [ 606.301187] check_noncircular+0x157/0x170 [ 606.301197] ? register_lock_class+0x48/0x490 [ 606.301213] __lock_acquire+0x16f9/0x2810 [ 606.301230] lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300 [ 606.301239] ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610 [ 606.301250] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 606.301261] ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90 [ 606.301274] ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610 [ 606.301284] __flush_work+0x250/0x610 [ 606.301293] ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610 [ 606.301305] ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10 [ 606.301318] ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90 [ 606.301331] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 606.301345] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x71/0x80 [ 606.301356] amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x287/0x4d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.301661] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.302050] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 606.302069] amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu] [ 606.302452] amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu] [ 606.302862] ? drm_sched_entity_error+0x82/0x190 [gpu_sched] [ 606.302890] amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu] [ 606.303366] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched] [ 606.303388] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680 [ 606.303409] worker_thread+0x190/0x350 [ 606.303424] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 606.303437] kthread+0xe7/0x120 [ 606.303449] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 606.303463] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [ 606.303476] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 606.303489] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 606.303512] </TASK> v2: Refactor lock handling to resolve circular dependency (Alex) - Introduced a `sched_work` flag to defer the call to `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` until after releasing `enforce_isolation_mutex`. - This change ensures that `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` is called outside the critical section, preventing the circular dependency and deadlock. - The `sched_work` flag is set within the mutex-protected section if conditions are met, and the actual function call is made afterward. - This approach ensures consistent lock acquisition order. Fixes: afefd6f ("drm/amdgpu: Implement Enforce Isolation Handler for KGD/KFD serialization") Cc: Christian König <[email protected]> Cc: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Srinivasan Shanmugam <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 0b6b2dd) Cc: [email protected]
captain5050
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 17, 2025
syz reports an out of bounds read: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ocfs2_match fs/ocfs2/dir.c:334 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ocfs2_search_dirblock+0x283/0x6e0 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:367 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88804d8b9982 by task syz-executor.2/14802 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 14802 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4 #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Sched_ext: serialise (enabled+all), task: runnable_at=-10ms Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x229/0x350 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0x164/0x530 mm/kasan/report.c:489 kasan_report+0x147/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:602 ocfs2_match fs/ocfs2/dir.c:334 [inline] ocfs2_search_dirblock+0x283/0x6e0 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:367 ocfs2_find_entry_id fs/ocfs2/dir.c:414 [inline] ocfs2_find_entry+0x1143/0x2db0 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:1078 ocfs2_find_files_on_disk+0x18e/0x530 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:1981 ocfs2_lookup_ino_from_name+0xb6/0x110 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:2003 ocfs2_lookup+0x30a/0xd40 fs/ocfs2/namei.c:122 lookup_open fs/namei.c:3627 [inline] open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:3748 [inline] path_openat+0x145a/0x3870 fs/namei.c:3984 do_filp_open+0xe9/0x1c0 fs/namei.c:4014 do_sys_openat2+0x135/0x1d0 fs/open.c:1402 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1417 [inline] __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1433 [inline] __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1428 [inline] __x64_sys_openat+0x15d/0x1c0 fs/open.c:1428 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x210 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f01076903ad Code: c3 e8 a7 2b 00 00 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f01084acfc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f01077cbf80 RCX: 00007f01076903ad RDX: 0000000000105042 RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: ffffffffffffff9c RBP: 00007f01077cbf80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00000000000001ff R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007f01077cbf80 R14: 00007f010764fc90 R15: 00007f010848d000 </TASK> ================================================================== And a general protection fault in ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert: ================================================================== loop0: detected capacity change from 0 to 32768 JBD2: Ignoring recovery information on journal ocfs2: Mounting device (7,0) on (node local, slot 0) with ordered data mode. Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5096 Comm: syz-executor792 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc4-syzkaller-00002-gb0da640826ba #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:ocfs2_find_dir_space_id fs/ocfs2/dir.c:3406 [inline] RIP: 0010:ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert+0x3309/0x5c70 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:4280 Code: 00 00 e8 2a 25 13 fe e9 ba 06 00 00 e8 20 25 13 fe e9 4f 01 00 00 e8 16 25 13 fe 49 8d 7f 08 49 8d 5f 09 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6 04 20 84 c0 0f 85 bd 23 00 00 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 0f RSP: 0018:ffffc9000af9f020 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: ffff88801e27a440 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000400 RDI: 0000000000000008 RBP: ffffc9000af9f830 R08: ffffffff8380395b R09: ffffffff838090a7 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffff88801e27a440 R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: ffff88803c660878 R14: f700000000000088 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 000055555a677380(0000) GS:ffff888020800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000560bce569178 CR3: 000000001de5a000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ocfs2_mknod+0xcaf/0x2b40 fs/ocfs2/namei.c:292 vfs_mknod+0x36d/0x3b0 fs/namei.c:4088 do_mknodat+0x3ec/0x5b0 __do_sys_mknodat fs/namei.c:4166 [inline] __se_sys_mknodat fs/namei.c:4163 [inline] __x64_sys_mknodat+0xa7/0xc0 fs/namei.c:4163 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f2dafda3a99 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 f1 17 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffe336a6658 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000103 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f2dafda3a99 RDX: 00000000000021c0 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c RBP: 00007f2dafe1b5f0 R08: 0000000000004480 R09: 000055555a6784c0 R10: 0000000000000103 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffe336a6680 R13: 00007ffe336a68a8 R14: 431bde82d7b634db R15: 00007f2dafdec03b </TASK> ================================================================== The two reports are all caused invalid negative i_size of dir inode. For ocfs2, dir_inode can't be negative or zero. Here add a check in which is called by ocfs2_check_dir_for_entry(). It fixes the second report as ocfs2_check_dir_for_entry() must be called before ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert(). Also set a up limit for dir with OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL. The i_size can't be great than blocksize. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reported-by: Jiacheng Xu <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ocfs2-devel/[email protected]/T/#u Reported-by: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/T/ Signed-off-by: Su Yue <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Heming Zhao <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]> Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]> Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]> Cc: Changwei Ge <[email protected]> Cc: Jun Piao <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
captain5050
force-pushed
the
google_tools_master
branch
from
January 17, 2025 22:24
e8e4188
to
bb15974
Compare
captain5050
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 22, 2025
irq_chip functions may be called in raw spinlock context. Therefore, we must also use a raw spinlock for our own internal locking. This fixes the following lockdep splat: [ 5.349336] ============================= [ 5.353349] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] [ 5.357361] 6.13.0-rc5+ #69 Tainted: G W [ 5.363031] ----------------------------- [ 5.367045] kworker/u17:1/44 is trying to lock: [ 5.371587] ffffff88018b02c0 (&chip->gpio_lock){....}-{3:3}, at: xgpio_irq_unmask (drivers/gpio/gpio-xilinx.c:433 (discriminator 8)) [ 5.380079] other info that might help us debug this: [ 5.385138] context-{5:5} [ 5.387762] 5 locks held by kworker/u17:1/44: [ 5.392123] #0: ffffff8800014958 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3204) [ 5.402260] #1: ffffffc082fcbdd8 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3205) [ 5.411528] #2: ffffff880172c900 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __device_attach (drivers/base/dd.c:1006) [ 5.419929] #3: ffffff88039c8268 (request_class#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __setup_irq (kernel/irq/internals.h:156 kernel/irq/manage.c:1596) [ 5.428331] #4: ffffff88039c80c8 (lock_class#2){....}-{2:2}, at: __setup_irq (kernel/irq/manage.c:1614) [ 5.436472] stack backtrace: [ 5.439359] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 44 Comm: kworker/u17:1 Tainted: G W 6.13.0-rc5+ #69 [ 5.448690] Tainted: [W]=WARN [ 5.451656] Hardware name: xlnx,zynqmp (DT) [ 5.455845] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func [ 5.461699] Call trace: [ 5.464147] show_stack+0x18/0x24 C [ 5.467821] dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123) [ 5.471501] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:130) [ 5.474824] __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4828 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4898 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5176) [ 5.478758] lock_acquire (arch/arm64/include/asm/percpu.h:40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:467 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5851 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5814) [ 5.482429] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave (include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:111 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162) [ 5.486797] xgpio_irq_unmask (drivers/gpio/gpio-xilinx.c:433 (discriminator 8)) [ 5.490737] irq_enable (kernel/irq/internals.h:236 kernel/irq/chip.c:170 kernel/irq/chip.c:439 kernel/irq/chip.c:432 kernel/irq/chip.c:345) [ 5.494060] __irq_startup (kernel/irq/internals.h:241 kernel/irq/chip.c:180 kernel/irq/chip.c:250) [ 5.497645] irq_startup (kernel/irq/chip.c:270) [ 5.501143] __setup_irq (kernel/irq/manage.c:1807) [ 5.504728] request_threaded_irq (kernel/irq/manage.c:2208) Fixes: a32c7ca ("gpio: gpio-xilinx: Add interrupt support") Signed-off-by: Sean Anderson <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <[email protected]>
captain5050
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 23, 2025
Daniel Machon says: ==================== net: lan969x: add FDMA support == Description: This series is the last of a multi-part series, that prepares and adds support for the new lan969x switch driver. The upstreaming efforts has been split into multiple series: 1) Prepare the Sparx5 driver for lan969x (merged) 2) Add support for lan969x (same basic features as Sparx5 provides excl. FDMA and VCAP, merged). 3) Add lan969x VCAP functionality (merged). 4) Add RGMII support (merged). --> 5) Add FDMA support. == FDMA support: The lan969x switch device uses the same FDMA engine as the Sparx5 switch device, with the same number of channels etc. This means we can utilize the newly added FDMA library, that is already in use by the lan966x and sparx5 drivers. As previous lan969x series, the FDMA implementation will hook into the Sparx5 implementation where possible, however both RX and TX handling will be done differently on lan969x and therefore requires a separate implementation of the RX and TX path. Details are in the commit description of the individual patches == Patch breakdown: Patch #1: Enable FDMA support on lan969x Patch #2: Split start()/stop() functions Patch #3: Activate TX FDMA in start() Patch #4: Ops out a few functions that differ on the two platforms Patch #5: Add FDMA implementation for lan969x v1: https://lore.kernel.org/20250109-sparx5-lan969x-switch-driver-5-v1-0-13d6d8451e63@microchip.com ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250113-sparx5-lan969x-switch-driver-5-v2-0-c468f02fd623@microchip.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
captain5050
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 23, 2025
Tariq Toukan says: ==================== net/mlx5e: CT: Add support for hardware steering This series start with one more HWS patch by Yevgeny, followed by patches that add support for connection tracking in hardware steering mode. It consists of: - patch #2 hooks up the CT ops for the new mode in the right places. - patch #3 moves a function into a common file, so it can be reused. - patch #4 uses the HWS API to implement connection tracking. The main advantage of hardware steering compared to software steering is vastly improved performance when adding/removing/updating rules. Using the T-Rex traffic generator to initiate multi-million UDP flows per second, a kernel running with these patches was able to offload ~600K unique UDP flows per second, a number around ~7x larger than software steering was able to achieve on the same hardware (256-thread AMD EPYC, 512 GB RAM, ConnectX 7 b2b). ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
captain5050
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 23, 2025
Petr Machata says: ==================== mlxsw: Move Tx header handling to PCI driver Amit Cohen writes: Tx header should be added to all packets transmitted from the CPU to Spectrum ASICs. Historically, handling this header was added as a driver function, as Tx header is different between Spectrum and Switch-X. From May 2021, there is no support for SwitchX-2 ASIC, and all the relevant code was removed. For now, there is no justification to handle Tx header as part of spectrum.c, we can handle this as part of PCI, in skb_transmit(). This change will also be useful when XDP support will be added to mlxsw, as for XDP_TX and XDP_REDIRECT actions, Tx header should be added before transmitting the packet. Patch set overview: Patches #1-#2 add structure to store Tx header info and initialize it Patch #3 moves definitions of Tx header fields to txheader.h Patch #4 moves Tx header handling to PCI driver Patch #5 removes unnecessary attribute ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
captain5050
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 23, 2025
During the update procedure, when overwrite element in a pre-allocated htab, the freeing of old_element is protected by the bucket lock. The reason why the bucket lock is necessary is that the old_element has already been stashed in htab->extra_elems after alloc_htab_elem() returns. If freeing the old_element after the bucket lock is unlocked, the stashed element may be reused by concurrent update procedure and the freeing of old_element will run concurrently with the reuse of the old_element. However, the invocation of check_and_free_fields() may acquire a spin-lock which violates the lockdep rule because its caller has already held a raw-spin-lock (bucket lock). The following warning will be reported when such race happens: BUG: scheduling while atomic: test_progs/676/0x00000003 3 locks held by test_progs/676: #0: ffffffff864b0240 (rcu_read_lock_trace){....}-{0:0}, at: bpf_prog_test_run_syscall+0x2c0/0x830 #1: ffff88810e961188 (&htab->lockdep_key){....}-{2:2}, at: htab_map_update_elem+0x306/0x1500 #2: ffff8881f4eac1b8 (&base->softirq_expiry_lock){....}-{2:2}, at: hrtimer_cancel_wait_running+0xe9/0x1b0 Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(O) Preemption disabled at: [<ffffffff817837a3>] htab_map_update_elem+0x293/0x1500 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 676 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G ... 6.12.0+ #11 Tainted: [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)... Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x70 dump_stack+0x10/0x20 __schedule_bug+0x120/0x170 __schedule+0x300c/0x4800 schedule_rtlock+0x37/0x60 rtlock_slowlock_locked+0x6d9/0x54c0 rt_spin_lock+0x168/0x230 hrtimer_cancel_wait_running+0xe9/0x1b0 hrtimer_cancel+0x24/0x30 bpf_timer_delete_work+0x1d/0x40 bpf_timer_cancel_and_free+0x5e/0x80 bpf_obj_free_fields+0x262/0x4a0 check_and_free_fields+0x1d0/0x280 htab_map_update_elem+0x7fc/0x1500 bpf_prog_9f90bc20768e0cb9_overwrite_cb+0x3f/0x43 bpf_prog_ea601c4649694dbd_overwrite_timer+0x5d/0x7e bpf_prog_test_run_syscall+0x322/0x830 __sys_bpf+0x135d/0x3ca0 __x64_sys_bpf+0x75/0xb0 x64_sys_call+0x1b5/0xa10 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 ... </TASK> It seems feasible to break the reuse and refill of per-cpu extra_elems into two independent parts: reuse the per-cpu extra_elems with bucket lock being held and refill the old_element as per-cpu extra_elems after the bucket lock is unlocked. However, it will make the concurrent overwrite procedures on the same CPU return unexpected -E2BIG error when the map is full. Therefore, the patch fixes the lock problem by breaking the cancelling of bpf_timer into two steps for PREEMPT_RT: 1) use hrtimer_try_to_cancel() and check its return value 2) if the timer is running, use hrtimer_cancel() through a kworker to cancel it again Considering that the current implementation of hrtimer_cancel() will try to acquire a being held softirq_expiry_lock when the current timer is running, these steps above are reasonable. However, it also has downside. When the timer is running, the cancelling of the timer is delayed when releasing the last map uref. The delay is also fixable (e.g., break the cancelling of bpf timer into two parts: one part in locked scope, another one in unlocked scope), it can be revised later if necessary. It is a bit hard to decide the right fix tag. One reason is that the problem depends on PREEMPT_RT which is enabled in v6.12. Considering the softirq_expiry_lock lock exists since v5.4 and bpf_timer is introduced in v5.15, the bpf_timer commit is used in the fixes tag and an extra depends-on tag is added to state the dependency on PREEMPT_RT. Fixes: b00628b ("bpf: Introduce bpf timers.") Depends-on: v6.12+ with PREEMPT_RT enabled Reported-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
captain5050
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 23, 2025
Hou Tao says: ==================== The patch set continues the previous work [1] to move all the freeings of htab elements out of bucket lock. One motivation for the patch set is the locking problem reported by Sebastian [2]: the freeing of bpf_timer under PREEMPT_RT may acquire a spin-lock (namely softirq_expiry_lock). However the freeing procedure for htab element has already held a raw-spin-lock (namely bucket lock), and it will trigger the warning: "BUG: scheduling while atomic" as demonstrated by the selftests patch. Another motivation is to reduce the locked scope of bucket lock. However, the patch set doesn't move all freeing of htab element out of bucket lock, it still keep the free of special fields in pre-allocated hash map under the protect of bucket lock in htab_map_update_elem(). The patch set is structured as follows: * Patch #1 moves the element freeing out of bucket lock for htab_lru_map_delete_node(). However the freeing is still in the locked scope of LRU raw spin lock. * Patch #2~#3 move the element freeing out of bucket lock for __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_elem() * Patch #4 cancels the bpf_timer in two steps to fix the locking problem in htab_map_update_elem() for PREEMPT_PRT. * Patch #5 adds a selftest for the locking problem Please see individual patches for more details. Comments are always welcome. --- v3: * patch #1: update the commit message to state that the freeing of special field is still in the locked scope of LRU raw spin lock * patch #4: cancel the bpf_timer in two steps only for PREEMPT_RT (suggested by Alexei) v2: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected] * cancels the bpf timer in two steps instead of breaking the reuse the refill of per-cpu ->extra_elems into two steps v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected] [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected] [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected] ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
captain5050
force-pushed
the
google_tools_master
branch
from
January 23, 2025 20:50
bb15974
to
7669b10
Compare
captain5050
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 24, 2025
It isn't guaranteed that NETWORK_INTERFACE_INFO::LinkSpeed will always be set by the server, so the client must handle any values and then prevent oopses like below from happening: Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1323 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.13.0-rc7 #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa45/0x1460 [cifs] Code: 00 00 48 89 df e8 3b cd 1b c1 41 f6 44 24 2c 04 0f 84 50 01 00 00 48 89 ef e8 e7 d0 1b c1 49 8b 44 24 18 31 d2 49 8d 7c 24 28 <48> f7 74 24 18 48 89 c3 e8 6e cf 1b c1 41 8b 6c 24 28 49 8d 7c 24 RSP: 0018:ffffc90001817be0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88811230022c RCX: ffffffffc041bd99 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000567 RDI: ffff888112300228 RBP: ffff888112300218 R08: fffff52000302f5f R09: ffffed1022fa58ac R10: ffff888117d2c566 R11: 00000000fffffffe R12: ffff888112300200 R13: 000000012a15343f R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff888113f2db58 FS: 00007fe27119e740(0000) GS:ffff888148600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fe2633c5000 CR3: 0000000124da0000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x27 ? die+0x2e/0x50 ? do_trap+0x159/0x1b0 ? cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa45/0x1460 [cifs] ? do_error_trap+0x90/0x130 ? cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa45/0x1460 [cifs] ? exc_divide_error+0x39/0x50 ? cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa45/0x1460 [cifs] ? asm_exc_divide_error+0x1a/0x20 ? cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa39/0x1460 [cifs] ? cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa45/0x1460 [cifs] ? seq_read_iter+0x42e/0x790 seq_read_iter+0x19a/0x790 proc_reg_read_iter+0xbe/0x110 ? __pfx_proc_reg_read_iter+0x10/0x10 vfs_read+0x469/0x570 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x398/0x760 ? __pfx_vfs_read+0x10/0x10 ? find_held_lock+0x8a/0xa0 ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10 ksys_read+0xd3/0x170 ? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10 ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x50/0x270 ? mark_held_locks+0x1a/0x90 do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7fe271288911 Code: 00 48 8b 15 01 25 10 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb bd e8 20 ad 01 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d b5 a7 10 00 00 74 13 31 c0 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 4f c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec RSP: 002b:00007ffe87c079d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000040000 RCX: 00007fe271288911 RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: 00007fe2633c6000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007ffe87c07a00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007fe2713e6380 R10: 0000000000000022 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000040000 R13: 00007fe2633c6000 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> Fix this by setting cifs_server_iface::speed to a sane value (1Gbps) by default when link speed is unset. Cc: Shyam Prasad N <[email protected]> Cc: Tom Talpey <[email protected]> Fixes: a6d8fb5 ("cifs: distribute channels across interfaces based on speed") Reported-by: Frank Sorenson <[email protected]> Reported-by: Jay Shin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>
captain5050
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 27, 2025
When kernel is built without debuginfo, running 'perf record' with --off-cpu results in segfault as below: ./perf record --off-cpu -e dummy sleep 1 libbpf: kernel BTF is missing at '/sys/kernel/btf/vmlinux', was CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF enabled? libbpf: failed to find '.BTF' ELF section in /lib/modules/6.13.0-rc3+/build/vmlinux libbpf: failed to find valid kernel BTF Segmentation fault (core dumped) The backtrace pointed to: #0 0x00000000100fb17c in btf.type_cnt () #1 0x00000000100fc1a8 in btf_find_by_name_kind () #2 0x00000000100fc38c in btf.find_by_name_kind () #3 0x00000000102ee3ac in off_cpu_prepare () #4 0x000000001002f78c in cmd_record () #5 0x00000000100aee78 in run_builtin () #6 0x00000000100af3e4 in handle_internal_command () #7 0x000000001001004c in main () Code sequence is: static void check_sched_switch_args(void) { struct btf *btf = btf__load_vmlinux_btf(); const struct btf_type *t1, *t2, *t3; u32 type_id; type_id = btf__find_by_name_kind(btf, "btf_trace_sched_switch", BTF_KIND_TYPEDEF); btf__load_vmlinux_btf() fails when CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF is not enabled. Here bpf__find_by_name_kind() calls btf__type_cnt() with NULL btf value and results in segfault. To fix this, add a check to see if btf is not NULL before invoking bpf__find_by_name_kind(). Reviewed-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Athira Rajeev <[email protected]> Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]> Cc: Disha Goel <[email protected]> Cc: Hari Bathini <[email protected]> Cc: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Kajol Jain <[email protected]> Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
captain5050
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 27, 2025
…rnel/git/at91/linux into soc/dt Microchip AT91 device tree updates for v6.14 #2 This update includes: - device tree files for the SAMA7D65 SoC and its evaluation board * tag 'at91-dt-6.14-2' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/at91/linux: ARM: dts: microchip: add support for sama7d65_curiosity board ARM: dts: microchip: add sama7d65 SoC DT Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
captain5050
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 27, 2025
The 32-bit Debian kernel 6.12 fails to boot and crashes like this: init (pid 65): Protection id trap (code 7) CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 65 Comm: init Not tainted 6.12.9 #2 Hardware name: 9000/778/B160L YZrvWESTHLNXBCVMcbcbcbcbOGFRQPDI PSW: 00000000000001000000000000001111 Not tainted r00-03 0004000f 110d39d0 109a6558 12974400 r04-07 12a810e0 12a810e0 00000000 12a81144 r08-11 12a81174 00000007 00000000 00000002 r12-15 f8c55c08 0000006c 00000001 f8c55c08 r16-19 00000002 f8c58620 002da3a8 0000004e r20-23 00001a46 0000000f 10754f84 00000000 r24-27 00000000 00000003 12ae6980 1127b9d0 r28-31 00000000 00000000 12974440 109a6558 sr00-03 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000010 sr04-07 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 IASQ: 00000000 00000000 IAOQ: 110d39d0 110d39d4 IIR: baadf00d ISR: 00000000 IOR: 110d39d0 CPU: 0 CR30: 128740c0 CR31: 00000000 ORIG_R28: 000003f3 IAOQ[0]: 0x110d39d0 IAOQ[1]: 0x110d39d4 RP(r2): security_sk_free+0x70/0x1a4 Backtrace: [<10d8c844>] __sk_destruct+0x2bc/0x378 [<10d8e33c>] sk_destruct+0x68/0x8c [<10d8e3dc>] __sk_free+0x7c/0x148 [<10d8e560>] sk_free+0xb8/0xf0 [<10f6420c>] unix_release_sock+0x3ac/0x50c [<10f643b8>] unix_release+0x4c/0x7c [<10d832f8>] __sock_release+0x5c/0xf8 [<10d833b4>] sock_close+0x20/0x44 [<107ba52c>] __fput+0xf8/0x468 [<107baa08>] __fput_sync+0xb4/0xd4 [<107b471c>] sys_close+0x44/0x94 [<10405334>] syscall_exit+0x0/0x10 Bisecting points to this commit which triggers the issue: commit 417c564 Author: KP Singh <[email protected]> Date: Fri Aug 16 17:43:07 2024 +0200 lsm: replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls After more analysis it seems that we don't fully implement the static calls and jump tables yet. Additionally the functions which mark kernel memory read-only or read-write-executable needs to be further enhanced to be able to fully support static calls. Enabling CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA=y was one possibility to trigger the issue, although YAMA isn't the reason for the fault. As a temporary solution disable JUMP_LABEL functionality to avoid the crashes. Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <[email protected]> Cc: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> # v6.12+
captain5050
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 28, 2025
This commit addresses a circular locking dependency issue within the GFX isolation mechanism. The problem was identified by a warning indicating a potential deadlock due to inconsistent lock acquisition order. - The `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use` and `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_end_use` functions previously acquired `enforce_isolation_mutex` and called `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl`, leading to potential deadlocks. ie., If `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` is called while `enforce_isolation_mutex` is held, and `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler` is called while `kfd_sch_mutex` is held, it can create a circular dependency. By ensuring consistent lock usage, this fix resolves the issue: [ 606.297333] ====================================================== [ 606.297343] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 606.297353] 6.10.0-amd-mlkd-610-311224-lof #19 Tainted: G OE [ 606.297365] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 606.297375] kworker/u96:3/3825 is trying to acquire lock: [ 606.297385] ffff9aa64e431cb8 ((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x232/0x610 [ 606.297413] but task is already holding lock: [ 606.297423] ffff9aa64e432338 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.297725] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 606.297738] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 606.297749] -> #2 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 606.297765] __mutex_lock+0x85/0x930 [ 606.297776] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 606.297786] amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.298007] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.298225] amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu] [ 606.298412] amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu] [ 606.298603] amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu] [ 606.298866] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched] [ 606.298880] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680 [ 606.298890] worker_thread+0x190/0x350 [ 606.298899] kthread+0xe7/0x120 [ 606.298908] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [ 606.298919] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 606.298929] -> #1 (&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 606.298947] __mutex_lock+0x85/0x930 [ 606.298956] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 606.298966] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler+0x87/0x370 [amdgpu] [ 606.299190] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680 [ 606.299199] worker_thread+0x190/0x350 [ 606.299208] kthread+0xe7/0x120 [ 606.299217] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [ 606.299227] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 606.299236] -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 606.299257] __lock_acquire+0x16f9/0x2810 [ 606.299267] lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300 [ 606.299276] __flush_work+0x250/0x610 [ 606.299286] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x71/0x80 [ 606.299296] amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x287/0x4d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.299509] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.299723] amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu] [ 606.299909] amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu] [ 606.300101] amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu] [ 606.300355] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched] [ 606.300369] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680 [ 606.300378] worker_thread+0x190/0x350 [ 606.300387] kthread+0xe7/0x120 [ 606.300396] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [ 606.300406] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 606.300416] other info that might help us debug this: [ 606.300428] Chain exists of: (work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work) --> &adev->enforce_isolation_mutex --> &adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex [ 606.300458] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 606.300468] CPU0 CPU1 [ 606.300476] ---- ---- [ 606.300484] lock(&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex); [ 606.300494] lock(&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex); [ 606.300508] lock(&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex); [ 606.300521] lock((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)); [ 606.300536] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 606.300546] 5 locks held by kworker/u96:3/3825: [ 606.300555] #0: ffff9aa5aa1f5d58 ((wq_completion)comp_1.1.0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x3f5/0x680 [ 606.300577] #1: ffffaa53c3c97e40 ((work_completion)(&sched->work_run_job)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1d6/0x680 [ 606.300600] #2: ffff9aa64e463c98 (&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x1c3/0x5d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.300837] #3: ffff9aa64e432338 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.301062] #4: ffffffff8c1a5660 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __flush_work+0x70/0x610 [ 606.301083] stack backtrace: [ 606.301092] CPU: 14 PID: 3825 Comm: kworker/u96:3 Tainted: G OE 6.10.0-amd-mlkd-610-311224-lof #19 [ 606.301109] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. X570S GAMING X/X570S GAMING X, BIOS F7 03/22/2024 [ 606.301124] Workqueue: comp_1.1.0 drm_sched_run_job_work [gpu_sched] [ 606.301140] Call Trace: [ 606.301146] <TASK> [ 606.301154] dump_stack_lvl+0x9b/0xf0 [ 606.301166] dump_stack+0x10/0x20 [ 606.301175] print_circular_bug+0x26c/0x340 [ 606.301187] check_noncircular+0x157/0x170 [ 606.301197] ? register_lock_class+0x48/0x490 [ 606.301213] __lock_acquire+0x16f9/0x2810 [ 606.301230] lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300 [ 606.301239] ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610 [ 606.301250] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 606.301261] ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90 [ 606.301274] ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610 [ 606.301284] __flush_work+0x250/0x610 [ 606.301293] ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610 [ 606.301305] ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10 [ 606.301318] ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90 [ 606.301331] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 606.301345] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x71/0x80 [ 606.301356] amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x287/0x4d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.301661] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.302050] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 606.302069] amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu] [ 606.302452] amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu] [ 606.302862] ? drm_sched_entity_error+0x82/0x190 [gpu_sched] [ 606.302890] amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu] [ 606.303366] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched] [ 606.303388] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680 [ 606.303409] worker_thread+0x190/0x350 [ 606.303424] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 606.303437] kthread+0xe7/0x120 [ 606.303449] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 606.303463] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [ 606.303476] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 606.303489] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 606.303512] </TASK> v2: Refactor lock handling to resolve circular dependency (Alex) - Introduced a `sched_work` flag to defer the call to `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` until after releasing `enforce_isolation_mutex`. - This change ensures that `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` is called outside the critical section, preventing the circular dependency and deadlock. - The `sched_work` flag is set within the mutex-protected section if conditions are met, and the actual function call is made afterward. - This approach ensures consistent lock acquisition order. Fixes: afefd6f ("drm/amdgpu: Implement Enforce Isolation Handler for KGD/KFD serialization") Cc: Christian König <[email protected]> Cc: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Srinivasan Shanmugam <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
captain5050
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Jan 28, 2025
A regression was caused by commit e4b5ccd ("drm/v3d: Ensure job pointer is set to NULL after job completion"), but this commit is not yet in next-fixes, fast-forward it. Try #2, first one didn't have v6.13 in it. Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <[email protected]>
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.
Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.
Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.
You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.
Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.
This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.
Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.
Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.
Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Bumps urllib3 from 2.0.7 to 2.2.2.
Release notes
Sourced from urllib3's releases.
... (truncated)
Changelog
Sourced from urllib3's changelog.
Commits
27e2a5c
Release 2.2.2 (#3406)accff72
Merge pull request from GHSA-34jh-p97f-mpxf34be4a5
Pin CFFI to a new release candidate instead of a Git commit (#3398)da41058
Bump browser-actions/setup-chrome from 1.6.0 to 1.7.1 (#3399)b07a669
Bump github/codeql-action from 2.13.4 to 3.25.6 (#3396)b8589ec
Measure coverage with v4 of artifact actions (#3394)f3bdc55
Allow triggering CI manually (#3391)5239265
Fix HTTP version in debug log (#3316)b34619f
Bump actions/checkout to 4.1.4 (#3387)9961d14
Bump browser-actions/setup-chrome from 1.5.0 to 1.6.0 (#3386)Dependabot will resolve any conflicts with this PR as long as you don't alter it yourself. You can also trigger a rebase manually by commenting
@dependabot rebase
.Dependabot commands and options
You can trigger Dependabot actions by commenting on this PR:
@dependabot rebase
will rebase this PR@dependabot recreate
will recreate this PR, overwriting any edits that have been made to it@dependabot merge
will merge this PR after your CI passes on it@dependabot squash and merge
will squash and merge this PR after your CI passes on it@dependabot cancel merge
will cancel a previously requested merge and block automerging@dependabot reopen
will reopen this PR if it is closed@dependabot close
will close this PR and stop Dependabot recreating it. You can achieve the same result by closing it manually@dependabot show <dependency name> ignore conditions
will show all of the ignore conditions of the specified dependency@dependabot ignore this major version
will close this PR and stop Dependabot creating any more for this major version (unless you reopen the PR or upgrade to it yourself)@dependabot ignore this minor version
will close this PR and stop Dependabot creating any more for this minor version (unless you reopen the PR or upgrade to it yourself)@dependabot ignore this dependency
will close this PR and stop Dependabot creating any more for this dependency (unless you reopen the PR or upgrade to it yourself)You can disable automated security fix PRs for this repo from the Security Alerts page.