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Try to reproduce the bytecode size blowup.
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test_programs/compile_success_no_bug/bytecode_size_regression/Nargo.toml
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[package] | ||
name = "bytecode_size_regression" | ||
type = "bin" | ||
authors = [""] | ||
compiler_version = ">=0.31.0" | ||
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[dependencies] |
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test_programs/compile_success_no_bug/bytecode_size_regression/src/main.nr
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// The code below is inspired by [compute_encrypted_log](https://github.com/AztecProtocol/aztec-packages/blob/b42756bc10175fea9eb60544759e9dbe41ae5e76/noir-projects/aztec-nr/aztec/src/encrypted_logs/payload.nr#L111) | ||
// which resulted in a bytecode size blowup when compiled to ACIR, see https://github.com/noir-lang/noir/issues/6929 | ||
// The issue was around `encrypted_bytes[offset + i]` generating large amounts of gates, as per the `flamegraph.sh` tool in aztec-packages. | ||
// The details around encryption and addresses have been stripped away, focusing on just copying bytes of equivalent size arrays. | ||
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use std::aes128::aes128_encrypt; | ||
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global PRIVATE_LOG_SIZE_IN_FIELDS: u32 = 18; | ||
global ENCRYPTED_PAYLOAD_SIZE_IN_BYTES: u32 = (PRIVATE_LOG_SIZE_IN_FIELDS - 1) * 31; | ||
global EPH_PK_SIZE: u32 = 32; | ||
global HEADER_SIZE: u32 = 48; | ||
global OVERHEAD_PADDING: u32 = 15; | ||
global OVERHEAD_SIZE: u32 = EPH_PK_SIZE + HEADER_SIZE + OVERHEAD_PADDING; | ||
global PLAINTEXT_LENGTH_SIZE: u32 = 2; | ||
global MAX_PRIVATE_LOG_PLAINTEXT_SIZE_IN_BYTES: u32 = | ||
ENCRYPTED_PAYLOAD_SIZE_IN_BYTES - OVERHEAD_SIZE - PLAINTEXT_LENGTH_SIZE - 1 /* aes padding */; | ||
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fn main( | ||
eph_pk_bytes: [u8; EPH_PK_SIZE], | ||
aes_secret: [u8; 32], | ||
incoming_header_ciphertext: [u8; HEADER_SIZE], | ||
extended_plaintext: [u8; MAX_PRIVATE_LOG_PLAINTEXT_SIZE_IN_BYTES + PLAINTEXT_LENGTH_SIZE], | ||
shift: u32, | ||
) -> pub [u8; ENCRYPTED_PAYLOAD_SIZE_IN_BYTES] { | ||
// unsafe { | ||
// compute_encrypted_log_unconstrained( | ||
// eph_pk_bytes, | ||
// aes_secret, | ||
// incoming_header_ciphertext, | ||
// extended_plaintext, | ||
// shift, | ||
// ) | ||
// } | ||
compute_encrypted_log( | ||
eph_pk_bytes, | ||
aes_secret, | ||
incoming_header_ciphertext, | ||
extended_plaintext, | ||
shift, | ||
) | ||
} | ||
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unconstrained fn compute_encrypted_log_unconstrained<let P: u32, let M: u32>( | ||
eph_pk_bytes: [u8; EPH_PK_SIZE], | ||
aes_secret: [u8; 32], | ||
incoming_header_ciphertext: [u8; HEADER_SIZE], | ||
plaintext: [u8; MAX_PRIVATE_LOG_PLAINTEXT_SIZE_IN_BYTES + PLAINTEXT_LENGTH_SIZE], | ||
shift: u32, | ||
) -> [u8; M] { | ||
compute_encrypted_log( | ||
eph_pk_bytes, | ||
aes_secret, | ||
incoming_header_ciphertext, | ||
plaintext, | ||
shift, | ||
) | ||
} | ||
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fn compute_encrypted_log<let P: u32, let M: u32>( | ||
eph_pk_bytes: [u8; EPH_PK_SIZE], | ||
aes_secret: [u8; 32], | ||
incoming_header_ciphertext: [u8; HEADER_SIZE], | ||
plaintext: [u8; P], | ||
shift: u32, | ||
) -> [u8; M] { | ||
let mut encrypted_bytes = [0; M]; | ||
let mut offset = 0; | ||
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// eph_pk | ||
for i in 0..EPH_PK_SIZE { | ||
encrypted_bytes[offset + i] = eph_pk_bytes[i]; | ||
} | ||
offset += EPH_PK_SIZE; | ||
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// incoming_header | ||
for i in 0..HEADER_SIZE { | ||
encrypted_bytes[offset + i] = incoming_header_ciphertext[i]; | ||
} | ||
offset += HEADER_SIZE; | ||
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// Padding. | ||
offset += OVERHEAD_PADDING; | ||
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// incoming_body | ||
let incoming_body_ciphertext = compute_incoming_body_ciphertext(plaintext, aes_secret); | ||
// Then we fill in the rest as the incoming body ciphertext | ||
let size = M - offset; | ||
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// NOTE: This made the bytecode size blowup disappear in aztec packages, | ||
// but in this reproduction the size seems to be statically known regardless. | ||
//let size = M - 32 - HEADER_SIZE - OVERHEAD_PADDING; | ||
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assert_eq(size, incoming_body_ciphertext.len(), "ciphertext length mismatch"); | ||
for i in 0..size { | ||
// NOTE: Adding `shift` makes the index dynamic enough to force ACIR to use memory operations. | ||
// Without `shift` it assigns directly to witnesses, which is good, but not what we wanted to reproduce. | ||
encrypted_bytes[offset + i + shift] = incoming_body_ciphertext[i]; | ||
} | ||
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encrypted_bytes | ||
} | ||
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pub fn compute_incoming_body_ciphertext<let P: u32>( | ||
plaintext: [u8; P], | ||
aes_secret: [u8; 32], | ||
) -> [u8] { | ||
let full_key = aes_secret; | ||
let mut sym_key = [0; 16]; | ||
let mut iv = [0; 16]; | ||
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for i in 0..16 { | ||
sym_key[i] = full_key[i]; | ||
iv[i] = full_key[i + 16]; | ||
} | ||
aes128_encrypt(plaintext, iv, sym_key) | ||
} |